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Don E. Fehrenbachert
The proportions of the Holmes Devise history of the Supreme
Court become all the more apparent when one realizes that this
1041 page volume by Carl B. Swisher' may prove to be the most
concise one in the series. It covers the entire twenty-eight year
history of the Taney Court, whereas three volumes, each pre-
sumably of similar size, have been allocated for the thirty-five
years of the Marshall Court. In the two volumes previously pub-
lished in the series, Julius Goebel, Jr., devoted 864 pages to the
rudimentary years before Marshall; 2 Charles Fairman, 1540 pages
to the nine years of the Chase Court.3 On a pages-per-year basis,
Fairman's book is about four and one-half times longer than
Swisher's. Not that Swisher was unduly cramped, of course. In
his account of the Charles River Bridge case, for example, he pro-
vides a contemporary pen portrait of Daniel Webster that takes
up a whole page, and many of his more than 3500 footnotes are
lengthened with quotation and comment. Nevertheless, Swisher's
volume is the most disciplined and widely usable, though perhaps
not the most original, of the three volumes published thus far.
Until now the principal general treatments of the Taney Court
have been eight chapters in Charles Warren's classic history4 and
a more recent work, begun by Charles Grove Haines and com-
pleted by Foster H. Sherwood, which was roughly handled by
t Professor of History, Stanford University.
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3. C. FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864-88: PART ONE, (1971), reviewed,
Benedict, 39 U. CI. L. REV. 862 (1972).
4. C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (1937) (this is a two
volume set).
reviewers.5 Swisher himself had been over the ground twice be-
fore-in his textbook, American Constitutional Development (1943),
and at greater length in his Roger B. Taney (1936). There are both
advantages and disadvantages in assigning such a project to a vet-
eran in the field. On the one hand, a certain standard of perfor-
mance can be depended upon, and in Swisher's case the standard
was high. His grasp, judiciousness, and professional integrity are
all plainly visible in The Taney Period, and his style is characteris-
tically crisp and clear. On the other hand, reworking a familiar
subject is not ordinarily conducive to fresh insights. Swisher does
offer much new information, particularly in specialties like mari-
time law, land law, and patent law.6 But his treatment of major
themes and landmark decisions, though never failing in craftsman-
ship, is seldom adventurous and sometimes almost perfunctory.
This is a book, moreover, that makes little contact with recent
scholarship. Swisher had completed work on the manuscript when
he died in 1968, but the six years that elapsed before publication
are only part of the total time-lag. The bibliography includes no
more than a half-dozen books and articles published since 1960.
One looks in vain for names like Stanley I. Kutler, R. Kent New-
myer, Arthur Bestor, Harold M. Hyman, Willard Hurst, and Mau-
rice Baxter; for Robert J. Harris's influential essay on Taney and
Frederick S. Allis's sparkling contribution to the historiography
of the Dred Scott decision. 7 Allan Nevins, significantly, is repre-
sented by The Emergence of Lincoln (1950), but not by The War for
the Union (first volume published in 1959). Scarcely ever does
Swisher engage in debate with other writers or evaluate their
work. For the most part, he goes his own way, having mastered an
enormous amount of printed source material and delved into
5. C. HAINES & F. SHERWOOD, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERN-
MENT AND POLITICS, 1835-1864 (1957).
6. See chs. 18, 20, 30, 31.
7. Cf. S. KUTLER, JUDICIAL POWER AND RECONSTRUCTION POLITICS (1968); S. KUTLER,
PRIVILEGE AND CREATIVE DESTRUCTION: THE CHARLES RIVER BRIDGE CASE (1971) [here-
inafter cited as PRIVILEGE]; THE DRED SCOTT DECISION: LAW OR POLITICS? (S. Kutler ed.
1967); R. NEWMYER, THE SUPREME COURT UNDER MARSHALL AND TANEY (1968); Bestor,
State Sovereignty and Slavery: A Reinterpretation of Proslavery Constitutional Doctrine, 54 J. ILL.
HIST. SOC. 117 (1961); Bestor, The American Civil War as a Constitutional Crisis, 69 AM.
HIST. REV. 327 (1964); H. HYMAN & B. THOMAS, STANTON: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF
LINCOLN'S SECRETARY OF WAR (1962); H. HYMAN, A MORE PERFECT UNION: THE IMPACT
OF THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION ON THE CONSTITUTION (1973); W. HURST, LAW
AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES (1956);
M. BAXTER, DANIEL WEBSTER AND THE SUPREME COURT (1966); Harris, Chief Justice Taney:
Prophet of Reform and Reaction, 10 VAND. L. REV. 227 (1957); Allis, The Dred Scott Labyrinth,
in TEACHERS OF HISTORY (H. Hughes ed. 1954).
1974] Review
The University of Chicago Law Review
more than sixty manuscript collections. His presentation is essen-
tially narrative, but with a good deal of skillful elucidation that re-
lieves the natural density of his subject matter. He keeps personal
sympathies, such as his admiration for Taney, under tight re-
straint. He prefers to withhold judgment rather than force the
evidence, and as a consequence sometimes leaves the reader hung
up between conflicting explanations.8
Neither in outlook nor in method does the Swisher of the 1960's
differ markedly from the Swisher of the 1930's. A political scien-
tist seemingly little affected by the revolutionary changes in his dis-
cipline, he does not quantify, generate theory, construct models,
or test hypotheses. He provides no diagrams of input and output.
His generalizations are unfashionably concrete and comprehen-
sible. He gives much attention to the political aspects and political
context of judicial history, but he makes no sustained effort of
his own to connect law with national culture and the "life of the
mind."9 In explaining the origins of the codification movement,
for example, he simply adopts the five-point conceptual frame-
work set forth by Charles Warren in 1911.10 Swisher deals readily
enough with problems and questions arising from his material,
but he takes few questions to the material. He has nothing to say,
for instance, about the significance of the Dred Scott decision"- in
the history of judicial review, and thus he never confronts the
problem of how the doctrine of judicial review, still almost entirely
untested at the level of federal law, could have survived such disas-
trous usage.' 2
The twenty-five pages devoted to the Charles River Bridge case'3
are more or less typical of Swisher's approach to his subject.' 4 At
some length he reviews the historical background of the case and
describes the arguments of counsel. He then summarizes the de-
cision itself in about three pages and follows with an account of
public and professional reactions to the decision. A brief conclu-
sion says little more than that the Court's ruling in favor of nar-
8. See, e.g., pp. 601 n.36, 618-19.
9. Cf. P. MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA: FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE
CIVIL WAR (1965). See also Scheiber, At the Borderland of Law and Economic History: The
Contributions of Willard Hurst, 75 AM. HIST. REV. 744 (1970).
10. Ch. 14; C. WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 508 (1911).
11. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
12. Cf Nelson, Changing Conceptions of Judicial Review: The Evolution of Constitutional
Theory in the States, 1790-1860, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 1166 (1972). There is no entry for "judi-
cial review" in Swisher's index.
13. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
14. See pp. 74-98.
[42:216
row construction of public grants has remained in good standing
ever since, and that the decision was not a radically new departure
in American constitutional history. There is no critique of Taney's
opinion, no mulling over the significance of the case. The dissent
of Justice Joseph Story receives short shrift and is treated as an
old fogy's exercise in legal traditionalism. Did Taney and Story dif-
fer merely "over the means to the same end," as Kutler believes, 15
or was their difference fundamental and irreconcilable, as New-
myer insists? 16 Were the facts of the case entirely relevant to
Taney's announced legal doctrine and social philosophy?17 Was
the decision essentially a victory for laissezfaire or positive govern-
ment, for liberated capitalism or community rights? Such ques-
tions are neither answered nor even asked by Swisher.
Similarly, in a short chapter titled "Political Questions and Judi-
cial Power," Swisher devotes ten pages to the background of Luther
v. Borden' and just one page to the opinion of the Court delivered
by Taney.' 9 The decision, he says, "firmly entrenched the princi-
ple that certain kinds of questions deeply involving the activities
of the political branches of government were to be treated as poli-
tical and not to be inquired into by the judiciary. ' 20 But there is
no theoretical discussion of judicial self-restraint and scarcely any
indication of the importance that the doctrine of political ques-
tions would assume in the twentieth century. Baker v. Carr21 is
cited in a footnote merely as a source of additional information
on the subject. Furthermore, Swisher takes no notice of the ex-
tent to which the Court's political motivations in the case contra-
dicted the very principle that it was enunciating. Neither does he
point out the paradox that in this classic statement of grounds for
judicial restraint, Taney's refusal to accept jurisdiction was ac-
companied by an extended discussion of the substantive issues
in the case.2
2
15. S. KUTLER, PRIVILEGE, supra note 7, at 100.
16. Newmyer, Justice Joseph Story, The Charles River Bridge Case and the Crisis of Repub-
licanism, 17 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 232, 233 (1973).
17. Cf. S. KUTLER, PRIVILEGE, supra note 7, at 170.
18. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
19. Pp. 515-27.
20. Pp. 526-27.
21. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
22. See generally M. GETTLEMAN, THE DoRR REBELLION (1973); W. WIECEK, THE
GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION (1972); Conron, Law, Politics, and Chief
Justice Taney: A Reconsideration of the Luther v. Borden Decision, 11 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 377
(1967); Schuchman, The Political Background of the Political Question Doctrine: The Judges
and the Dorr War, 16 AM. J. LEG. HIsT. 111 (1972).
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To speak of the "Taney Court" in the same breath with the Mar-
shall Court is, of course, in some respects misleading; for Taney
never equalled nor tried to equal Marshall in judicial leadership.
A divided Court became normal during his tenure, and unlike
Marshall he did not monopolize the role of spokesman in impor-
tant cases. For one thing, he was not infrequently a dissenter.
Swisher attributes the change in part to Taney's democratic incli-
nation and a generous desire to share the limelight with his col-
leagues. "The Taney Court was to be genuinely a Court . .. and
not a reflection of the ideas and the personality of the Chief
Justice. '23 It seems just as likely, however, that Taney's physical
frailty24 was the principal reason why he so often delegated the
work of writing opinions. As for the decline of consensus in his
Court, that reflects perhaps a less masterful but at the same time
a more inflexible temperament than Marshall's. In spite of his
gentle demeanor, Taney was easily the more dogmatic of the two
and thus the less capable of achieving consensus.
The complexity of divisions within the Court is well illustrated
in Swisher's three chapters on the commerce decisions, 25 a rela-
tively familiar story well told, and also in his chapter on "The
Rights of Corporations. '26 As of 1840, corporations had been rec-
ognized as artificial persons but had been denied citizenship rights
under the diverse-citizenship clause and under the privileges-and-
immunities clause. Whether corporations could be litigants in fed-
eral suits depended upon the citizenship of their individual stock-
holders, and diversity had to be complete. 27 Then came the Letson
case of 1844, in which, among other complications, diversity was
incomplete. 28 The opinion of the Court, written by James M.
Wayne, not only overruled two unanimous decisions rendered
just four years earlier but went beyond all arguments of counsel
to declare that a corporation was to be deemed a resident of the
state in which it had been chartered and therefore "capable of
23. P. 98.
24. See pp. 264, 720-22. Taney was frequently pictured as on the edge of the grave.
In 1843, Justice John Catron predicted that he would not live more than three years.
P. 258. On Taney generally, see Winitsky, Roger B. Taney: A Historiographical Inquiry, 69
MD. HIST. MAG. 1 (1974).
25. Chs. 15-17.
26. Ch. 19.
27. Commercial & R.R. Bank v. Slocumb, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 60 (1840); Bank of Augusta
v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839); Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
518 (1819); Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809); Straw-
bridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
28. Louisville, Cin. & Charl. R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844).
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being treated as a citizen of that State, as much as a natural per-
son." The holding itself merely had the effect of embracing cor-
porations in the diverse-citizenship clause, but Wayne's sweeping
language seemed to make them citizens in all respects.
By the 1850's, the Court was beating a disorderly retreat from
the Letson decision. Justices Peter V. Daniel and, it appears, John
A. Campbell wanted to repudiate even the pre-Letson" positions
and separate corporations completely from the diverse-citizenship
clause. A majority of members preferred, however, to repudiate
the rationale of the Letson decision while preserving its effect.
They believed that, in the interest of justice, corporations and
their adversaries should have access to federal courts, but at
the same time they were sensitive to Daniel's argument that (in
Swisher's paraphrase) "if a corporation could be treated as a citi-
zen for any purpose it might be so treated for all purposes, in-
cluding the right to aspire to the Presidency. '29 Justice Robert C.
Grier resolved the difficulty in 1854 when, as Swisher says, he
"introduced an enormously important fiction"--namely, that the
stockholders or directors of a corporation "may be justly pre-
sumed to be resident in the state which is the necessary habitat
of the corporation, and where alone they can be made subject to
suit." :3 0 By this neat trick of assuming that the persons in control
of a corporation were all citizens of the chartering state, the Court
could go on treating corporations de facto as citizens under the di-
verse-citizenship clause while solemnly insisting, as Taney did in
1862, that de jure such suits involved only "individual persons."31
Taney's participation in the subterfuge becomes all the more
interesting when one compares it with his stern and unambiguous
holding in the Dred Scott case that Negroes neither were, nor ever
could be, citizens within the meaning of the diverse-citizenship
clause.32 In reaching that conclusion, the Chief Justice adopted
the same all-or-nothing formula used by Daniel in his attacks
on the Letson doctrine. He assumed that if Negroes were acknowl-
edged to be citizens in respect to one part of the Constitution,
they must be regarded as citizens in every respect; the framers,
he insisted, could never have intended to make such a dangerous
concession. 33
29. Pp. 465-66.
30. P. 468, quoting Marshall v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314 (1854).
31. Ohio & Miss. R.R. v. Wheeler, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 286, 297 (1862).
32. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 416-17 (1857).
33. R. NEwM.IYER, supra note 7, at 133.
1974] Review
The University of Chicago Law Review
In a total of seven chapters, constituting about one-fifth of the
entire book, Swisher gives extensive coverage to the judicial as-
pects of the slavery controversy. 34 It is a clear and accurate sur-
vey that includes some attention to slavery cases tried at the cir-
cuit court level. The fifty pages or so on the Dred Scott decision
and its "aftermath" 35 blend constitutional and political history in
a lively narrative, but Swisher has nothing new to reveal and does
not probe very far below the surface of events. It is a routine treat-
ment of what ought to have been the climax of the volume. In
summarizing the twenty-five year background of the case, for ex-
ample, he routinely relies on the book by Vincent C. Hopkins,
first published in 1951,36 apparently never having seen Walter
Ehrlich's unpublished but in some respects superior study of the
same vintage.3 7 The legal and political history of the case during
its three years before the Supreme Court (1854-57) occupies
some eighteen pages, rich in personality and incident. Less than
half that amount of space is given to the decision of the Court and
all of its nine separate opinions. Taney's opinion, surely one of
the most famous documents in American constitutional history,
is summarized in just three pages, with scarcely any analysis or
criticism.
Thus, Swisher echoes Taney in asserting that one of the princi-
pal questions before the Court was whether "any Negro with slave
ancestors could be a citizen of the United States within the mean-
ing of the clause of the Constitution which gave jurisdiction to
federal courts in cases involving diversity of citizenship. ' 38 Now
the fact is that the clause involved only state citizenship (how else
could there be any "diversity"?), but Taney virtually rewrote it
by interpreting the words "between citizens of different states" to
mean, in effect, "between citizens of the United States residing in
different states." Then, in an astonishing passage, he went on to
declare that a person might "have all of the rights and privileges
of the citizen of a State, and yet not be entitled to the rights and
privileges of a citizen in any other State. '39 It is unlikely that one
could phrase a more direct contradiction of the privileges-and-
immunities clause.
34. Chs. 22-28.
35. Chs. 24-25.
36. V. HOPKINS, DRED SCOTT'S CASE (1951).
37. W. Ehrlich, History of the Dred Scott Case Through the Decision of 1857 (unpub-
lished Ph.D. diss., Washington University, 1950).
38. P. 623.
39. 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 405.
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Similarly, there is no question raised about the accuracy of
Taney's statement that at the time of the framing of the Consti-
tution, free Negroes "had no rights which the white man was
bound to respect. '40 Neither is there any discussion of his state-
ment that "the right of property in a slave is distinctly and ex-
pressly affirmed in the Constitution,' 41 nor of his bizarre in-
terpretation of the territory clause, nor of his assertion that the
government under the Articles of Confederation "had none of
the attributes of sovereignty, 42 nor of the many other question-
able uses of law and history with which the Chief Justice rein-
forced his opinion. 43
Granted, historians have as a rule neglected textual criticism
of the Dred Scott decision. More surprising is Swisher's failure to
examine the problem that has aroused the greatest amount of
scholarly controversy-namely, wh'at the Court "really" decided
and, more specifically, whether Taney's ruling against the con-
stitutionality of the Missouri Compromise was obiter dictum.
Indeed, even Swisher's skill at clarification somewhat fails him
here; for he does not adequately explain the confusion caused
by the double-layered jurisdictional question and by the peculiar
circularity of relationship between the jurisdictional question and
the merits of the case. He gives no attention at all, moreover, to
the problem of whether Taney, in some of his conclusions, spoke
for only a minority of the Court.44
There is a sense in which legal and constitutional history is a
branch of intellectual history. The Taney Period proves to be most
disappointing precisely in this respect. Judicial thought is briefed
but seldom studied or evaluated. Swisher is content to be a re-
porter rather than a critic. But for anyone interested in the Court
as a functioning institution and in the mixture of personalities
constituting its membership, this is at once a book that can be
read through with considerable pleasure and a useful reference
work to be kept close at hand.
40. Id. at 407.
41. Id. at 451.
42. Id. at 434.
43. Id. at 436-41.
44. Cf. Allis, supra note 7.
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